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Practice-as-research continues to 
struggle with its epistemic value. For 
the most part we seem to have 
stopped grappling with the 
complexity of what it is that we might 
know or understand as a 
consequence of artistic research. 
Instead, it is now assumed that 
artists producing art in the context of 
the academy are, by default, 
producing knowledge. In this writing I 
explore the epistemic conditions of 
producing artistic research, and 
imagine PaR’s vital and disruptive 
role in the so-called knowledge 
economy. 
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 Introduction: Curious times 
We live and work in curious times. These are times in which human beings 
are thought of as “profit-and-loss calculators;”1 in which “the attitude of the 
salesman has become enmeshed in all modes of self-expression.”2 In 
higher education scholarship, it is the time of “research capitalism,”3 when 
we – academics that is – are expected “to produce knowledge that is 
directly applicable to the needs and priorities of the community at large as 
identified … by the private and government sectors.”4 This is the time of 
the corporate university; founded on language that Stefan Collini – a 
professor of Intellectual History and English Literature – calls Prodspeak: 
“technology transfer, knowledge economy, grant generation, frontier 
research, efficiency, and accountability.”5 We are (re)producers of the 
knowledge economy.6 Curious times indeed. 
But I am wasting time. It is the curse of the idealist. I am an academic 
idealist; and I’m an artist. More specifically I am a dance-artist, and in the 
UK, Australia and New Zealand, being an artist-in-the-academy in these 
curious times means making artistic work to be part of the same economy 
of knowledge production as scholarship in science or the arts and 
humanities. This activity is called various things, mostly practice-as-
research in the UK, but I quite like the term artistic research that tends to 
be used in continental Europe; and I agree with Henk Borgdorff, Professor 
of Theory of Research in the Arts at Leiden University in The Hague, when 
he writes that in artistic research “art practice is paramount as the subject 
matter, the method, the context, and the outcome.”7 
I am writing about practice-as-research, knowledge and production 
because I suspect that artistic research has a vital role to play in corrupting 
and contaminating these curious times in higher education. I also suspect 
that this role is part epistemic and part ethical; it is ethical in the sense of 
what might be good for our society. Indeed, in many respects this writing is 
an attempt to conjure up an ethics of epistemology in practice-as-research. 
This chapter has three sections. In The knowledge economy, I outline the 
relationship between dance research and knowledge production. Next, in 
Epistemology of practice-as-research, I look to clarify the epistemic 
limitations of practice-as-research, and make a case for an epistemology 
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that expands into a crowd of understandings. Finally, in Contempt and the 
thing-produced, I discuss the materials produced in practice-as-research, 
and the role they might have in reconfiguring or challenging research in 
higher education. 
The knowledge economy 
The term knowledge economy was introduced by the American 
management consultant Peter Drucker in 1969. He wrote that “what 
matters in the ‘knowledge economy’ is whether knowledge, old or new, is 
applicable.”8 Drucker was not seduced by the age of knowledge, but rather 
the “imagination and skill of whoever applies” it.9 At the heart of the 
knowledge economy is the knowledge worker: “the man or woman who 
applies to productive work ideas, concepts, and information rather than 
manual skill or brawn.”10 Drucker distinguishes intellectual knowledge from 
knowledge work. Intellectual knowledge is “what is in a book;”11 it is only 
information or data, and usually thought of as something new. He suggests 
that knowledge is a form of energy that exists in the work of applying 
something to that information. 
Contemporary scholarship is caught somewhere between pursuing 
intellectual endeavour and generating useful research for the knowledge 
economy. When academics read, hear or say ‘knowledge-production,’ it is 
difficult to pry apart the various histories, goals, systems and ideologies at 
play when we do our research. I can imagine the feeling when we come to 
understand that what we think we are doing (scholarly and intellectual 
endeavour) is utterly different from what we are actually doing (producing 
useful knowledge for the knowledge economy). This is the scholarly 
equivalent of believing you are in Radiohead when in reality you play bass 
for Coldplay. 
Perhaps such delusion is a mechanism to cope with varying degrees of 
uncertainty about how our work is culturally valued or understood. Perhaps 
we want to have our cake and eat it by producing intellectual knowledge 
while serving the knowledge economy (and keeping our jobs). It is certain, 
and certainly less palatable, that we now chronically conflate the 
production of intellectual knowledge with contributing to the knowledge 
economy. It is even more unfortunate that academics are being cajoled and 
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 conditioned by the corporate university to understand our scholarly worth 
as being about the extent to which we can apply our scholarship; that is to 
produce useful knowledge for the knowledge economy. 
While it may be that Drucker initially separated the knowledge economy 
from intellectual knowledge, for academics in contemporary higher 
education doing scholarly work is synonymous with the production of 
knowledge for the knowledge economy; they are seamlessly integrated. 
Such integration exists in our rhetoric, in the language we use as writers, 
and in the public assessment of research (through processes like the 
Research Excellence Framework in the UK).12 How we understand or 
come to know things, experiences and sensations is shaped by ideological 
systems of production. And what is forgotten or passed over, unknown, 
misunderstood or mysterious is similarly shaped – or deformed – by those 
same systems. We have absorbed the ideology of the knowledge producer 
who serves the knowledge economy, and when we use the term 
knowledge, we leave the ambiguity hanging. 
In this chapter, I use the term knowledge in the conflated and ambiguous 
way – both intellectual endeavour and a tool for the knowledge economy. I 
do so to recognise its common usage in contemporary higher education, 
and to acknowledge that the absence of nuance enables academics rather 
fortuitously to speak with different audiences in the academy (with different 
goals, desires, histories and understandings) as if we are talking about the 
same thing. For example, even the statement “I am doing research” comes 
loaded with ambiguity because of how different people might understand 
differently the epistemic value and purpose of doing research. 
In dance research, we have busily created our own lexicon of words to do 
with thinking, intelligence and knowledge: embodied knowledge, 
choreographic thinking, physical intelligence, somatic knowing, bodily 
knowledge, choreographic knowledge, knowledge practices, choreographic 
intelligence, bodily lived (experiential) knowledge, kinetic intelligence. 
Our willingness and ease to attach these knowledge-knowing-intelligence-
thinking suffixes to dance and choreographic ideas is telling. Perhaps it is 
about a relatively new academic discipline grappling with how to discuss 
and describe phenomena. Or perhaps we in dance are simply following 
higher education or cultural trends to knowledge-ify our language. 
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Nevertheless, together the terms imply that we have welcomed the 
demands of the knowledge economy – to apply our imaginations and skills 
as means of production – to the practices of choreography and dance. I 
wonder though if the easy addition of suffixes also reveals a certain 
insecurity: that we in dance research are a little too desperate to sit at the 
big table with the knowledge-producing grown-ups regardless of what we 
might be giving up or denaturing, or who we might be alienating, or indeed 
what it is that choreographers and dancers actually do. 
The culture of reifying knowledge and knowledge production (and all their 
ambiguities) has also infiltrated the artistic world of dance. The dance critic 
and artist Jamie Conde-Salazar has suggested that “the dance of the 
future produces knowledge.”13 Similarly, the anthropologist James Leach 
wrote that “there is a conscious attempt on the part of contemporary dance 
to elevate itself in public perception through transforming its processes into 
‘knowledge production’, to make it a practice commensurate with other 
valued spheres of action in the ‘knowledge economy’.”14 Yet just because a 
field – for example dance research, professional artistic dance, or even 
practice-as-research – says it produces knowledge does not make it so. 
Perhaps the apotheosis of the knowledge production push in dance studies 
– and as Leach states, in the professional community too – has been the 
funding, research and development of dance archives.15 The big expensive 
ones have names like Motion Bank,16 Synchronous Objects,17 and Siobhan 
Davies RePlay.18 These archives – each with different emphases – are 
important assets to our community. They make it possible for people to 
access aspects of the inaccessible. It is also their usefulness that helps 
dance to nestle neatly into the knowledge economy. Their utility and value 
to the knowledge economy is strengthened because the archives are (by 
and large) tech-driven, they are tangible and reasonably permanent 
enough, and their outcomes are relatively easy to measure through online 
user analysis. Speaking and writing as a choreographer, I would suggest 
that these kinds of archives tend to attenuate the epistemological value 
and tangled messiness of choreographic practice. 
Dance research’s relationship with the knowledge economy has as least 
two divergent strands. The first strand relates to the politics and economics 
of simply making dance research happen. Like the examples of archives 
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 above, it contains research that is highly visible and dependent on 
relatively large-scale funding bids that are themselves linked to research 
agendas staged by Government and private organisations. This kind of 
dance research is important not least because it helps place scholarly 
dance research on cultural, economic and political maps. But it is also 
limited because of the adaptive demands of fitting dance research into 
general funding calls. In other words, what needs to happen to any dance 
research in order for it to fall within the limitations of funding agendas? In 
the case of dance archives, the fit is – as I have already suggested – 
comfortable; the same might be said for dance research projects involving 
other contemporary technological preoccupations like augmented reality, 
virtual reality and motion capture that satisfy the technological myopia of 
contemporary culture (and its funding bodies). 
The second strand is epistemic and involves the tangled messiness of 
choreographic practice that is more at odds with broad funding agendas. It 
is also predicated on the sense that practice-as-research is a growing 
subset of all dance research (and I would guess that it is, at least in the 
UK, Australia and NZ). This second strand of dance research’s relationship 
to the knowledge economy is built on two questions: What is the epistemic 
project of practice-as-research in general, or perhaps in other words how 
does practice-as-research participate in the knowledge economy? What 
happens to that economy when practice-as-research participates in it? 
The next two sections deal with this latter strand of dance research, but the 
ideas are certainly not limited to dance thinking and practices. Rather, I 
use my biases and experience in dance practice and research as a 
platform to reveal the kind of epistemic messiness that underscores the 
contribution of practice-as-research to research in general. 
Epistemology of practice-as-research 
Erik Knudsen, the filmmaker, practice-as-research specialist, and 
Professor of Media Practice at University of Central Lancashire in the UK, 
says that “research is research, knowledge is knowledge, but there are 
many different ways of generating that knowledge.”19 Knudsen’s work here 
is equivalence: to compel us to believe that scholars from all disciplines are 
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all in the same boat trying to “generate new knowledge … in original 
ways.”20 
I appreciate Knudsen’s desire to put an end to some of the anxieties of 
artist-scholars grappling with epistemic questions, but I think he’s wrong 
saying that knowledge is knowledge regardless of how it is produced and 
in what contexts it is produced. I think he’s wrong because the key 
ideological project of practice-as-research has been to get art “on the 
books as research”21 by bending it into the dominant epistemic systems of 
the academy. There are good reasons for wanting to do these kinds of 
gymnastics: status, legitimacy, resources. Performing these back-flips – 
mostly injury free – has certainly kept me in a job. 
Similarly, although with a focus on choreographic research, dance 
philosopher Anna Pakes from the University of Roehampton in London 
writes that: 
Unless we can identify the choreographer-researcher’s claim to 
knowledge, it remains difficult to maintain that choreographic 
research has equivalent status with other, more traditional forms 
of scholarly enquiry.22 
I suspect that the desire for equivalent status is actually a distraction from 
the profound epistemic possibilities of artistic research. These possibilities 
do not lie in concepts like phronesis (practical wisdom) that Pakes herself 
has discussed.23 She suggests that phronesis is “a creative sensitivity to 
circumstances as they present themselves.”24 The simple problem with 
phronesis, and its cousins techne and poiesis, is that I possess them 
regardless of the research project, regardless of whether or not anything 
happened at all. Research is, after all, fundamentally about noticing 
change: as a consequence of this process, this experiment, this 
intervention, this grappling with historical evidence (etc), what is different? 
What has changed? What do I, we, you understand differently, and how 
are these differences shared? I might be able to articulate what is different 
or changed, but in the case of practice-as-research how do the artistic 
works – those things-produced – do their own work? 
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 Henk Borgdorff from Leiden University in The Hague favours “unfinished 
thinking” as being central to the epistemological work of practice-as-
research.25 For Borgdorff, artistic research involves a “paradoxical 
invitation”26 in which art invites reflection but “eludes any defining 
thought”27 or “explanatory gaze.”28 This is the work of the artist-scholar: to 
leave or create room for “our implicit, tacit, non-conceptual, non-discursive 
relations with the world and with ourselves;”29 what Susan Melrose called 
“disciplined unknowing.”30 By doing so, “our thinking is set in motion”31 by 
artistic-research (or art for that matter), with no attempt to finish that 
thinking. This is, at least in part, a constructivist perspective, and it seals 
off the epistemological heavy lifting of practice-as-research from the so-
called knowledge producer. Such a separation between producer and 
produced invites radical epistemic exchanges – or creative encounters – 
between research and its audiences. The distinctiveness of these 
exchanges rests with the ambiguity and slipperiness of the affective 
responses and thinking set in motion by artistic-research. That is, any 
performative offer through artistic-research, makes possible an 
unpredictable and unimaginable number of understandings and affects. 
At the other end of the world, in the University of Canberra’s Centre for 
Creative and Cultural Research, Paul Magee is making similar propositions 
to Borgdorff but in relation to writing and poetry. His suggestion – with a 
nod to how universities have their “artistic moments”32 – is that artist-
scholars do no more than produce something “like a compelling, 
mesmerising question.”33 
Magee also discusses a multi-voiced epistemology in practice-as-research; 
a type of crowd epistemology of unlike minds. He writes that “we think not 
in monologue but in dialogue, that is, in a medley of voices that variously 
propose, reply, interject and argue, all within the head we might refer to as 
‘I’; that is what you do when you think … there’s actually no ‘you’ there, 
unless in the plural.”34 Although Magee is describing the plurality of a 
single mind, what if we take his words more literally? That we extrapolate 
his thinking such that it is research itself that fundamentally involves a 
medley of voices, and only you in the plural form? Magee also suggests 
that a modern poem is a “device for generating creative desire – the desire 
for meaning, for resolution, for further aesthetic experience, for an infinite 
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number of things – in others.”35 These others – public audiences and 
critical research friends – extend the artist-scholars’ understanding of their 
own work, and make experiences of newness, surprise and difference 
possible for the artist. It is the audience’s relationship and exchange with 
the thing-produced that drastically set apart practice-as-research from 
other forms of research. The epistemic value of practice-as-research – 
what the arts and research community understand differently because of 
the research – is created through the act of the thing-produced being 
experienced. Practice-as-research is dependent on its audience to do its 
epistemic work. 
The politics and ethics of these epistemic propositions are important. By 
relinquishing ownership of knowledge, by resisting the singular author (and 
her, his or their knowledge-producing ambitions), we tend towards a crowd 
of understandings that diminish my contribution, that diminish any claims I 
might like to make, that fold in my ignorance as a key epistemic component 
of practice-as-research. This is different from washing my hands or not 
taking responsibility for what is made: the thing-produced. Rather, it is 
recognising that, as the philosopher Stanley Cavell said, “our relation to the 
world as a whole … is not one of knowing.”36 Further, even the possibility 
of first-person not knowing (that is, under certain conditions, and in certain 
circumstances, ‘I am ignorant’) is built on collective understanding. 
Theologian Stephanie Berbec says of Judith Butler that she “writes from 
the perspective that there is no I without first a we …. [pushing] toward a 
politics of alliance, cohabitation, and interdependency.”37 
The American poet and writer Wendell Berry wrote that one of our 
problems as humans is we “cannot live without acting: we have to act. 
Moreover, we have to act on the basis of what we know, and what we know 
is incomplete. … And so the question of how to act in ignorance is 
paramount.”38 My proposition is an expanded epistemology in practice-as-
research where artist-scholars push willfully into the crowd while staying 
mindful that how we understand our practices and actions is predicated on 
incompleteness. By acknowledging our ignorance, we can test and work 
with ideas through practice that exist at the border of our awareness, 
understanding and ignorance. That we expand into mystery, uncertainty 
and “moral complexity,”39 in which the academy might once again become 
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 a place for grappling with the spirit, the divine, the unknowable, and 
ignorance itself. It makes perfect sense that centres of understanding – 
places of knowledge – should openly welcome and encounter such things. 
It is at such borders – between knowing and not-knowing, ignorance and 
understanding, vulnerability and certainty, mess and clarity, tangle and 
order – that the most fecund forms of friction are manifest. 
It is how practice-as-research relates to epistemic vulnerability that 
becomes so vital and powerfully tenuous. The members of the After 
Performance research collective, writing in Contemporary Theatre Review, 
suggest that: 
To profess to not know in today’s knowledge economy … seems 
to be an act of making oneself vulnerable. … One might claim 
there is indeed ‘capital’ attached to the practices of not knowing … 
To share that raw intellectual vulnerability incites a process of 
exposure and giving of oneself to others, to be held and 
supported, so that our own truths can be aligned, and then re-
calibrated, via our collectivity and adjacency.40 
With such vulnerability in mind, what I am calling for here in practice-as-
research is an expanded epistemology: that we understand the ontology of 
practice-as-research to be dependent – at least in part – on its crowd-
based or communal epistemic conditions. Practice-as-research is brought 
into being by its artistic cells or components, and it is research predicated 
on we. The ways of knowing in artistic research become unspeakable 
dialogues between the artistic/creative works and their audiences, and 
unspeakability is a terrifying possibility for the academy. The various and 
unpredictable dialogues are unspeakable because they are built on 
ignorance and mystery, and because they are only ever approaching 
knowledges asymptotically. We – artist-scholars together with our 
audiences – are producing something that can never arrive as knowledge – 
whether its purpose is intellectual endeavour or applied knowledge for the 
knowledge economy. 
Contempt and the thing-produced 
I propose that in practice-as-research we are not producing knowledge, 
and that our work is all the more important for doing nothing of the kind. Art 
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and design scholar Steven Scrivener41 has tried to make epistemic sense 
of practice-as-research by using the “standard account” which defines 
knowledge as justified, true, belief. That is, “where the thing that we know 
appears true, we believe it to be true and we can justify our belief.”42 He 
argues for an artwork to claim new knowledge it must communicate and 
justify that knowledge, and stridently believes that no art work can make 
such claims. In other words, the thing-produced is by no means producing 
knowledge as justified, true, belief, even if and when accompanied by 
some form of supporting or contextualising text in which the author makes 
and stakes claims for what-is-known. And if – like Pakes – we try and make 
epistemic sense of practice-as-research through the work of Aristotle, 
David Carr and Gilbert Ryle43 then this only accounts for the phronetic 
know-how that underpins all practice-as-research projects by any given 
group or individual. Such know-how is common to all research (not just the 
creative kind), and – as I have argued earlier in this chapter – does not 
account for the potential changes in understandings that arise from 
research; changes that are fundamental to understanding the epistemic 
value of any and all research. 
For performance theorist Adrian Heathfield, one of the strengths of 
research through and in performance is about “staging processes of 
knowing that can’t easily be resolved into identifiable knowledge products 
that will then circulate smoothly in the ‘knowledge economy’.”44 Heathfield 
is implicitly proposing research through performance to be a thrombus or 
clot in the circulatory system of the knowledge economy – that how 
performance might do its most valuable work is when it is in relationship to 
ways of knowing that are not able to shape – or be shaped by – the various 
tools and systems of the knowledge economy. But what does he mean by 
a ‘process of knowing’ and how would we recognise it if we were involved 
in one? Heathfield prefaces his ideas by suggesting that “we could leave 
behind the whole framework of thinking of research as knowledge 
production entirely.”45 Of course, it is not clear if he means entirely in the 
context of that particular discussion in Contemporary Theatre Review or as 
a guiding principle to understand research generally. 
We – artist-scholars that is – are certainly producing something that the 
academy recognises as knowledge through its research monitoring and 
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 assessment exercises (like the Research Excellence Framework in the 
UK). Such recognition is the case even if the epistemic nature of those 
things-produced remains contested in practice-as-research scholarly 
literature. Given the historic and ongoing epistemic uncertainty of practice-
as-research, its acceptance as a knowledge producing activity in the 
academy is a remarkable phenomenon. It is akin to a relatively new sport, 
played in only a few pockets of the world each with markedly different 
rules, being invited to be an official sport in the Olympic Games. Gold for 
practice-as-research! 
But what if – as I argue – these things-produced are not knowledge? What 
are the conditions of production for practice-as-research and what are their 
epistemic implications for Universities and artist-scholars? There are two 
key conditions: 
Condition 1: Artist-scholars are clearly producing something. I have already 
argued – based on the work of Magee46 and Borgdorff47 – that the 
epistemic nature of the things-produced is something akin to asking 
questions, “unfinished thinking,”48 or a crowd-oriented medley of voices.49 
Condition 2: Despite the recognition of practice-as-research in international 
research assessment exercises and peer-reviewed journals,50 artist-
scholars do not produce any version of knowledge that is accepted and 
valorised within knowledge economies. 
If the above two conditions are accurate or true then what follows is either: 
a) the things that are produced by artist-scholars should not be ‘counted’ or 
involved in the labour of universities; or b) in order to unconditionally 
accept practice-as-research then universities need to adapt or change 
what is considered to be knowledge producing work, and even the nature 
of research itself. 
What is most curious is that in UK higher education the current situation 
would appear to be some paradoxical combination of a) and b) in which 
artist-scholars do not produce knowledge and yet their work is still 
circulated (even if not always smoothly) in the higher education knowledge 
economy. 
What makes such a paradox possible? Who or what is making the 
compromises that sustains the paradox? If I were to imagine that as a 
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researcher I am making few if any compromises in the development, 
production and presentation of the things-produced, but they are still 
participating in or contributing to the so-called knowledge economy, then 
the knowledge economy – and its epistemic fundamentals – has changed 
without even knowing or recognising it. This situation is like a glitch51 or an 
‘other world’ of ignorance, imagination and messiness that the epistemic 
hegemony of the academy is not even aware of; or that by accepting 
practice-as-research the scholarly hegemony thinks it has swallowed 
another version or epistemic iteration of itself without needing to clear its 
throat. Even more curious is that under these conditions practice-as-
research ought to have no fiscal value in the market-place of the 
knowledge economy. 
The Cameroonian philosopher Achille Mbembe wrote that “As a result of 
the conflation of knowledge, technology and markets, contempt will be 
extended to anyone who has nothing to sell.”52 I can imagine that in 
practice-as-research, rather than producing knowledge and with nothing to 
sell in the economy of knowledge, we are merely producing contempt. 
It is by working closely with ignorance, and the subsequent production of 
contempt that practice-as-research work – the thing-produced – becomes 
vital in these curious times. That as people not producing knowledge while 
participating as a bug-like glitch in the knowledge economy we help to 
create the thinnest of openings for imagining how research – and its 
epistemic underpinnings – might change, adapt or evolve, and even what 
the work and function of universities might become. In such a way, those of 
us who are contempt-producing knowledge workers, along with our 
“subterranean, interpersonal, muddy, and emergent”53 research, might play 
an un-productive and ethical role in ways of knowing and their place in our 
culture and society. 
In 1969, Peter Drucker wrote of the knowledge economy that the “key to 
productivity was knowledge, not sweat.”54 If “being ethical may actually 
mean being inefficient at times,”55 then even in my role as a knowledge 
worker, producing sweat might be a way to be less productive, and more 
aware of my ignorance. After all, I am quite open to a bit of sweat. 
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Simon Ellis producing sweating in Our White Friend, by Colin, Simon and I. © Stephen Wright Photography (2016). CC-BY. 
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53 Heathfield in Butt, Heathfield, and Keidan, “Performance Matters,” 114. 
54 Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity, 254. 
55 Berg and Seeber, The Slow Professor, 60. 
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